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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
____________ 
 
No. 12-3964 
_____________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
ROD PEREZ, 
                            Appellant 
______________ 
 
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY 
 (D.C. Crim. No. 2-11-cr-00862-001) 
District Judge:  Honorable Katharine S. Hayden  
____________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
July 11, 2013 
____________ 
 
Before: GREENAWAY, JR., SLOVITER and BARRY, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion Filed: July 19, 2013) 
____________ 
 
OPINION 
____________ 
 
BARRY, Circuit Judge 
Appellant Rod Perez was found guilty at trial of eight drug-related offenses and 
was sentenced to 120 months‟ imprisonment.  He appeals the decision of the District 
Court denying his request to give the jury a supplemental instruction in response to two 
 2 
of its questions.  We will affirm.  
I.
1
 
On December 16, 2011, Perez was charged in an eight-count indictment, which 
included conspiracy counts involving the importation and distribution of heroin and 
cocaine, and counts of aiding and abetting the distribution and importation of those 
narcotics.  During trial, among other instructions, the District Court charged the jury on 
accomplice liability in accordance with the Third Circuit‟s Model Jury Instruction § 7.02.  
See Supp. App. 155. 
 While the jury was deliberating, it sent a note asking two questions about the 
accomplice liability instruction.  Specifically, it asked: “Is providing an instruction 
sufficient to show „some act‟ for the purposes of the 3rd and 4th elements of aiding and 
abetting? Same question  . . .  but a suggestion rather than an instruction.”  App. 501. In 
broad summary, the third and fourth elements require the jury to find that a defendant 
knowingly did some act for the purpose of aiding or encouraging the commission of the 
specific offense charged, with the intent that that offense be committed, and that his act 
aid or encourage the commission of the offense.   
 During a discussion with the District Court about the jury‟s questions, the parties 
agreed that an instruction by the defendant would be sufficient to constitute an act for 
purposes of aiding and abetting liability, but disagreed as to whether a suggestion would 
be enough.  The government argued that “a suggestion may be enough depending upon 
                                                 
1
 The District Court exercised jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231. This Court 
exercises jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
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the circumstances surrounding that suggestion.”  App. 506.  On the other hand, Perez 
asserted that “a suggestion could not be sufficient because it is just inconsistent with what 
the jury would have to find beyond a reasonable doubt, to find that the instruction was 
with a specific intent to commit an offense.” Id. 
 Although the District Court considered providing affirmative answers to the jury‟s 
questions, it ultimately declined to do so out of concern for unduly influencing the jury. 
The Court acknowledged that our caselaw had “given jurors and judges and lawyers 
every possible thing in the world to fill in for some act,” and concluded that “getting too 
particularized [in answering these questions, would risk] driving a verdict in a way that is 
not [its] job to do.” Id. at 520-21.  Instead, the Court responded in the following manner: 
You have asked 2 questions that focus on the 3rd and 4th requirements 
which the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt in order to 
find Mr. Perez guilty of aiding and abetting the crimes enumerated in 
Counts 3 and 4 and 7 and 8.  
 
 It is for you to decide if the government has proven beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the defendant did some act and if that act was done 
knowingly and for the purpose of assisting the commission of the offenses 
charged in each of Counts 3 and 4 and 7 and 8 and with the intent that the 
charged offenses committed and that the act did in some way assist in the 
commission of the offenses charged in Counts 3 and 4 and 7 and 8. The act 
need not itself be against the law. 
 
Id. at 522-23.  Perez objected to the Court‟s response and asked the Court to instruct the 
jury that “a suggestion in and of itself would not be sufficient.” Id. at 523. 
 Perez argues to us that the District Court abused its discretion in failing to give the 
jury appropriate guidance as to whether a suggestion could satisfy the “some act” 
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element. We review for abuse of discretion a district court‟s refusal to give a 
supplemental jury instruction and will reverse only if the decision was “„arbitrary, 
fanciful or clearly unreasonable.‟”  United States v. Jackson, 443 F.3d 293, 297 (3d Cir. 
2006) (quoting Stich v. United States, 730 F.2d 115, 118 (3d Cir. 1984)).  
 There is no merit to Perez‟s argument that the District Court‟s response failed to 
give the jury appropriate guidance.  Given the lack of context for the word “suggestion” 
in the jury‟s note and the potential impact of a supplemental instruction excluding 
“suggestion” from qualifying as “some act,” the Court‟s measured response was neither 
arbitrary nor clearly unreasonable.  See App. 521 (“[W]ho knows how [the jury is] 
defining a suggestion. Who knows what particular thing they believe that Mr. Perez did 
fits in. And I think by getting too particularized on this, we‟re making a decision for them 
and it is not our job it is their job.”).  Instead of risking unduly influencing the jury, the 
Court sufficiently answered the jury‟s question in referring to its previous instructions, 
and this decision was well within its discretion.  
II. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of sentence.   
 
